Genesis
When I had first applied to the MA program at Sam Houston State, I had confidently selected the thesis track for myself. I had enjoyed writing research papers during my undergraduate studies. Looking back I am not so proud of my major capstone paper over counter-revolutionary thought in the French Revolution. The aristocracy was pissed because they were not in charge anymore. Congratulation on figuring that one out, jackass. I had taken my capstone course early because the professor I wanted to take the course with was going to retire after that semester. I was woefully under prepared to write a work of that scope at that point. Oh well, I still passed. Live and learn.
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| The wholesome card game where the whole family can destroy the enemies of the people! |
I was, however, very proud of my minor program, National Security Studies, capstone where I argued that the cause of the Spanish-American War was caused by pressure from interest groups within each nation. The Spanish needed to prop up a monarchy on perilous footing and McKinley caved to pressure from party members with interests in Cuba.
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| When in doubt, write about Roosevelt. |
At the outset of my master's program I settled on the war & violence track. I am a veteran, of course I would. I really had no more specific interests than that so I would cast the widest net possible in my course selections. I took the obligatory Civil War and Reconstruction course my first semester. I do not think there is a history department in the United States that does not offer this class. It had been by far the most crowded upper-level history course I had taken as an undergrad. Early on in the class I realized I was not very interested in the topic. I knew my thesis would require new scholarship on a topic and what could I possibly say that had not been said? We read amazing works on the obvious topics of combat, politics, and slavery as well as ones covering more obscure subjects like the environment and how battlefield injuries changed the ideas of manliness.
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| An amazing work and one of many that taught me that I had (still have) a long way to go in my work to become a good historian. |
Besides, I had grown up in Texas with family from Louisiana and Alabama and had long since burned out on hearing about it. I simply could not muster up the interest to power through a research project on the subject. I also learned while combing the archives of the Rosenberg Library for documents relating to the Battle of Galveston that the cursive script of that era gives me massive migraines.
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| Not only a nice place to research, but the Old Moon Deli and Pies is within walking distance and worth the trip all on its own. |
I moved through the course work taking various courses, most of which just did not pique my interest. I had enjoyed my seminar on military history, which had focused on the Second World War, but what the hell was there new to say about that topic? As I started to come up on the deadline to write my prospectus and form a committee I had a minor panic episode. I had taken pretty much every course there was in my track and did not feel a real attachment to any topic. Except one.
My favorite course by far had been my seminar on World War II. Since my job in the Corps had been amphibious assault I found myself drawn to Craig Symond's Operation Neptune. Using that work I had written an paper for the course that would become the basis for my thesis. The question came up again, how in the world can I write something original. I had zeroed in on writing about Operation Overlord. You can not throw a ball in a bookstore, I do not actually recommend this, without hitting at least three books that are about or reference the Normandy landings.
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| I devoured this book more completely and quicker than anything else I read during my MA program. |
As I began reading my way through the historiography it struck me that the Shingle landings at Anzio had occurred only six months before Overlord and had suffered only thirteen fatalities during the landing phase. There had to be something there I could work with, there just had to be. What had all of these other historians missed that I could capitalize on? Then it struck me, all of the works I read treated each battle or operation more or less in it's own bubble. That is not to say they ignored the rest of the war, but they generally only looked ahead not around and back.
Comparison, that is what they lacked. And that was where I would start my research.
Now, you could go ahead and scoff at the idea. "Apples to oranges" you could say. I won't lie, in some cases you would be right. There are however very solid reasons for this approach. I would research Shingle and Overlord to deduce what factors allowed few deaths on one beach and a slaughter on the other.
The Perspective Reason
Each military operation is different and faces it's own unique challenges. I know this. Commanders always operate in the fog of war. Duh. Hindsight is 20/20. You're missing the point. Nobody will ever have all of the answers. Arguing over what cost the lives of so many soldiers and sailors can not bring them back. I am not trying to do any of these things. I am looking for a new way to view an old topic.
Looking at an operation in this light can change how we perceive it and bring to light other ideas that may not have been obvious before. When I began it was simply about putting Shingle side-by-side with Overlord. As I did this some interesting points came up. It is a well known fact that there was strife within the Anglo-American alliance. Hell, anytime you put two people in a room there will be disagreements. What I did notice that has not been clear in earlier studies is that although the Americans and British agreed on the letter of their strategy, it had a different spirit to each of the cousins.
Overlord was always going to happen short of either the Wehrmacht or Red Army completely collapsing before it had been launched but it was meant to achieve different goals based on who you asked. In comparing Overlord to Shingle, it becomes very obvious that Overlord was intended for a different reason by the two parties jointly preparing for it.
The United States wanted the earliest possible Overlord to utilize as the opening blow to put the Germans on the ropes. Since the Japanese had brought the Americans into the war and presented a more direct threat, there had to be a grand operation to justify the "Germany First" policy. Also, taking some pressure off the long embattled Red Army might just convince Stalin to join the Yankees in their campaign in the Pacific. Get it done fast through France so you can make a friend and focus on the next task.
The British, having fought longer than the US, saw Overlord as a finishing blow to an already faltering Wehrmacht. It was better to face them where they are weak and only go for the jaw when they were sagging. Plus, Churchill had little use for Stalin beyond defeating Hitler. He feared what Stalin might be up to in his European backyard. Better to be standing next to him when the Third Reich fell lest Lenin's successor got any wise ideas about spreading his communist ideals on England's block. Get the job done it it's own time and show up in force in Eastern Europe to let Stalin know the United Kingdom is still kicking.
Even with the industrial output of the United States, military forces and the means to move them ashore (*cough* LSTs *cough*) were still finite. So as the British tried to move the war east through the Mediterranean basin it robbed Overlord of its full potential from an American perspective. To the British it Overlord only had to be overwhelming to an already defeated army. By comparing the two operations you get a fuller context of how the two allies envisioned the end of Hitler's Germany and what impact that difference of outlook had on the course of the war. I have seen some historians show how the debates between the American and British leadership changed Overlord, but no one that I have read deals with the implications of these changes.
The Practical Justification
The short and sweet of this point is what I already mentioned, I needed a new approach to a well worn topic and every work I could find failed to compare Overlord to other landings as a means to analyze it. It also serves as a familiar exercise to anyone who has ever served in the military, an after-action review (AAR).
As we have already established, yes each operation is unique, but you can always draw lessons that will be beneficial in the future. You don't start from scratch each and every time. Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs) are not a detailed blueprint for every event someone might encounter, but a set of basic instructions to fall back on when faced with a problem. If you have an over specified plan, you lack improvisation. If you lack a basic set of plans and procedures, you have no starting point from which to tackle a problem. AAR's allow the military to look at what went right and wrong in each exercise or operation and then apply those to enhancing SOPs. We never know everything because we have never seen everything. We are, or should be, always learning.
By comparing Shingle to Overlord We see what went right at Anzio and how those lessons were, not ignored, but simply not implemented at Normandy.
